Why we stopped when we stopped: Operation Sindoor reset deterrence, hit targets, set new response rules

Addressing the nation on Monday, the prime minister asserted that operations against Pakistan have only been kept in abeyance, and that the future will depend on its behaviour. While this has cleared the air on India's game plan, many have been questioning India's decision to agree to a 'stoppage of fire'. But the sequence of events outlined in official briefings establishes that this temporary cessation was proposed by Pakistan to India through the US, which claimed it played mediator.

India's military use of force this time differed from previous responses after Uri and Pulwama in two key points:

This time, the J&K 'trap' has been broken by striking deep targets inside Pakistani territory and POK, rather than restricting our retaliatory actions to J&K in general and the LoC in particular. In the past, such restraint had unintentionally aided Pakistan by advancing the argument that J&K is a 'disputed' territory.


While the operation commenced with strikes on 9 terrorist camps and training areas, it evolved into devastating attacks on vital military infrastructure, including airfields, radars, command-and-control sites, and missile/ammunition storage facilities, complemented by destruction of LoC posts.

To fairly assess the soundness of India's decision, we must first understand Operation Sindoor's objectives. In his briefing on May 11, India's DGMO Lt Gen Rajiv Ghai outlined the military objective as 'conceptualised with a clear military aim to punish the perpetrators and planners of terror and to destroy their terror infrastructure'. So, India's retaliatory strikes were at the mid-level of the spectrum of conflict, below an all-out war.

Military action was integrated with other elements - economic, political and diplomatic - including suspending the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). India also reinforced the salience of the international border and LoC by closing trade points and people-to-people contacts.

While strategic political objectives were not explicitly stated, they can be logically inferred. Based on the limited application of military force, India's strategic aims were to demonstrate resolve, raise costs and impose caution on Pakistan, and restore deterrence, which had waned since the Balakot airstrikes in 2019.

What would have happened if we had continued to press Pakistan for a few more days or weeks, or expanded the scope of Op Sindoor by launching an all-out war? In this case, India's objective would have been to force Pakistan to assure the dismantling of terror infrastructure by discrediting their army, something the PM stated in his Monday national address.

In the India-Pakistan context, war can change the status quo, but may not resolve the political issue: J&K. Capturing large parts of Pakistani territory during a war as leverage for post-conflict bargaining may also not change Pakistan's mindset. Pakistan did not stop supporting the Afghan Taliban despite sustained use of drones by the US and killing of its civilians even before the disorderly exit of US forces in 2022.

Getting Pakistan to give - and adhere to - an assurance to stop using terrorism as an instrument of state policy is, perhaps, unachievable. It had made similar promises earlier in 2002. Islamabad has routinely reneged on agreements, relying on outright deniability and obfuscation. This was recently evident in Shehbaz Sharif's claims of victory and press briefings by Pakistani service officers during Op Sindoor.

A sustained military campaign with Pakistan would undoubtedly be detrimental to India's aim of becoming a developed country by 2047. Pakistan, a basket case, has little to lose. Escalation dominance is key to orchestrating such operations. However, an overly severe response could lead to counterproductive escalation.

So, how can India be future-ready? Even if the J&K issue were settled, peace between the two neighbours would still be unlikely, as the conflict is not a territorial dispute but an ideological one. We need to recognise the inevitability of terrorist attacks by Pakistan in the future. A low-level response - such as firing across the LoC, or no response to terrorist acts - is perceived by Pakistan as weakness. It meets Rawalpindi's cost-benefit threshold, and does not deter future escalation.

We need to develop capability to hit Pakistan routinely, destroying military infrastructure with the intent to inflict harm, without large-scale posturing and deployment along the borders. Retaliation to high-profile terrorist acts by Pakistan should not carry the narrative of retributive punishment, but should aim to impose high costs for breaching red lines and influence its decision-making calculus to deter future attacks.

India's narrative of attacking terrorist infra also needs calibration. These targets may be vacated, moved deeper over time, and targetable infrastructure will diminish. To maintain deterrence against Pakistan's deep state, India should not differentiate between terrorists and the Pakistani army. This avoids advancing the alibi that non-state actors are not under its control.

India, as Narendra Modi said on Monday, will consider any future act of terror as an act of war and will respond accordingly. With this, the India-Pakistan equation has permanently changed by the introduction of certainty of retaliation to every attack. This will stop Pakistan's belligerent behaviour for as long as possible.

Retaliation by Pakistan, especially along LoC in J&K, isn't complete loss of deterrence. At the strategic level, victory means achieving national objectives. This is what Operation Sindoor, as an inflection point, has achieved decisively and unequivocally.

The writer is a former vice-chief of army staff, Indian Army


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