Pahalgam Attack: Why China's support for Pakistan may be all talk, no action

In the wake of the Pahalgam terror attack, China has voiced support for Pakistan, calling for an “impartial” investigation while backing Islamabad’s “legitimate security concerns.”

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s comments reveal Beijing’s cautious posture: “Conflict is not in the fundamental interests of either India or Pakistan," he told Pakistan’s deputy PM Ishaq Dar, calling for both sides to "exercise restraint". In parallel, China and Pakistan worked behind closed doors to dilute the UN Security Council’s condemnation of the Pahalgam attack. Unlike the strong Pulwama statement in 2019, the UNSC statement after Pahalgam conspicuously avoided direct support for India’s investigation.

ALSO READ: India closes its airspace for Pakistani aircraft

But how far is Chinese President Xi Jinping willing to go in support of Pakistan if India opts for a kinetic military response to avenge the Pahalgam terror attack? Will Beijing's backing remain confined to diplomatic assurances, or could it extend to a more direct show of support for its “all-weather” ally?

A deeper look reveals a sharp limit to how far President Xi may be willing to go - exposing a hard truth: Pakistan, famously called "China’s Israel," by General Xiong Guangkai, former intelligence chief of the PLA, cannot count on Beijing for unconditional support.

ALSO READ: Airspace blockade: India plots a flight path to skip Pakistan

Munir (mis)calculated?
Pakistan’s army chief General Asim Munir, who previously oversaw ISI operations during the 2019 Pulwama incident, may have viewed a Kashmir-related escalation as both a strategic diversion and a means to rally domestic unity. The Pahalgam attack could have appeared to him as a calculated tactical move, especially against a backdrop of severe economic decline, political unrest, and widespread public resentment over military interference in civilian affairs.

Munir may also have assessed that global attention is diverted elsewhere—towards conflicts in Gaza, Ukraine, and tensions over Taiwan. U.S. political focus remains fragmented amid internal turmoil, while Gulf nations are adjusting their regional priorities. Meanwhile, Pakistan continues to rely on its longstanding partnership with China to navigate diplomatic and strategic challenges.

ALSO READ: What makes this India-Pakistan standoff more dangerous than past ones

Pakistan's value for China has decreased
Pakistan’s strategic value to China hinges on three pillars: Access to Afghanistan, infrastructure leverage through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and military containment of India.

All three have weakened.

Taliban. China has now built a direct relationship with the Afghan regime, bypassing Islamabad. It no longer needs Pakistan to manage Kabul.

CPEC. Once marketed as the crown jewel of the Belt and Road Initiative, it is now viewed within Chinese policymaking circles as an expensive liability. Gwadar port-a planned rival to Dubai-remains underdeveloped, marred by insurgency, local resentment, and unpaid contractors. A project meant to showcase China’s global ambition now reflects its limitations.

Military leverage. Pakistan’s utility in bottling up Indian strategic bandwidth remains, but the cost of association with an increasingly unstable, militarized regime-where jihadist linkages bleed into state structures-is rising.

What likely concerns Beijing more than the prospect of Indian retaliation is the risk of spillover—especially into Xinjiang, a region where it has spent decades suppressing Islamist extremism. The growing influence of Taliban-style ideology within Pakistan’s security establishment signals a warning, not a cause for support.

Ghosts of 1971
Pakistan’s belief in Chinese military backing has spanned decades—rooted more in perception than actual precedent. During the 1971 Indo-Pak war, which resulted in the formation of Bangladesh, Islamabad hoped for Chinese military involvement that ultimately never materialised.

As per Andrew Small's China-Pakistan Axis, a Dawn editorial published in 1972 offered a sobering post-mortem: “Had we not presumed that we would get unlimited Chinese support, regardless of our objectives and conduct, the country might have been saved from humiliation and defeat.”

The pattern has remained largely consistent. Beijing provides diplomatic support, economic influence, and strategic alignment—but stops short of direct military involvement. It didn’t intervene then, and likely won’t now.

Between the lines

What lies behind China's reluctance?
PLA instability: Xi’s ongoing military purges have destabilized China's armed forces at the top. Over a dozen generals, including the heads of China’s nuclear and missile commands, have been removed. Confidence in the PLA’s combat readiness is at its lowest in a decade.

Domestic turbulence: Xi faces a fragile domestic scene — purging the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), battling an export slowdown, and trying to ensure his political survival ahead of the 2027 party congress.

Trade war tensions: China’s economy is reeling under a trade war with the US, slowing growth and fragile consumer sentiment. Xi is wary of fueling regional instability that could further rattle markets.

India matters more: Amid Donald Trump's tariff war, economic headwinds, and political churn, China seeks to cool tensions with India. After the deadly 2020 Ladakh clash, Beijing has quietly disengaged and de-escalated, recognising India’s crucial role in its regional strategy.

Taiwan is top priority: Beijing’s urgent focus is Taiwan, the South China Sea, and strengthening economic partnerships in Southeast Asia. South Asia, despite its strategic significance, is secondary right now.

China's balancing act

India has already taken a series of measures, including the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty. This is a first; it has never happened since the signing of the treaty. PM Modi, in a high-profile security meeting, has given a carte blanche to security forces to determine their response as per their time, mode, and place of choice.

Pakistan’s gamble: Munir, already facing internal collapse, may have miscalculated the global mood. If he was betting on China to shield Pakistan diplomatically after Pahalgam, it may prove to be a strategic blunder.

Xi's balancing act: Beijing is likely to maintain vocal support for Pakistan while privately encouraging de-escalation. At this stage, President Xi appears more focused on stabilising relations with India and advancing domestic priorities than on symbolic gestures of solidarity with Islamabad.

(With TOI inputs)